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Abstract
Contemporary governance is increasingly characterized by the consultation of different 
types of stakeholders, such as interest groups representing economic and citizen inter-
ests, as well as public and private institutions, such as public authorities and firms. Previ-
ous research has demonstrated that public officials use a variety of tools to involve these 
actors in policymaking. Yet, we have limited knowledge on how particular consultation 
approaches relate to stakeholder participation. To what extent do open, closed and hybrid 
consultation approaches, with the first two, respectively, referring to the use of public and 
targeted tools, and the third one implying a combination of both of them, relate to the 
policy engagement of a different set of stakeholders? In this paper, we identify the differ-
ent tools used by the European Commission to engage stakeholders in policymaking and 
assess how variation in consultation approaches relates to stakeholder participation via a 
descriptive and multivariate analysis. We rely on two datasets: a regulatory database that 
contains detailed information on 41 EU regulations and a stakeholder database that com-
prises 2617 stakeholders that were involved in these regulations through different consulta-
tion tools. Our main finding is that implementing different consultation approaches affects 
stakeholder diversity. Specifically, closed consultation approaches lead to a lower level of 
business dominance than hybrid approaches that combine open and targeted consultation 
tools.
Keywords Consultation · Consultation approach · Business dominance · Stakeholder 
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Academics and public officials agree that insight into systems of stakeholder consultation is 
imperative to understanding dynamics and outcomes of public governance. Scholars have 
highlighted that consultation practices affect political participation and shape the capac-
ity of governments to solve societal problems in an effective and legitimate way (Bing-
ham et al. 2005). Likewise, supranational institutions such as the OECD and the European 
Commission have underlined the importance of stakeholder consultation to collect infor-
mation for evidence-based policymaking and to ensure that regulations are aligned with the 
public interest (European Commission 2017a; OECD 2012). While the engagement of a 
variety of stakeholders is considered an important characteristic of good governance, there 
are also possible instrumental benefits. As argued by Nabatchi (2012, p. 704), if public offi-
cials involve a more diverse set of stakeholders, “they give voice to multiple perspectives 
and different interests, allowing for more thoughtful decisions that take a broader view 
of those who will benefit or be harmed by an action (Beierle and Cayford 2002; Sirianni 
2009)". From the perspective of public officials, inclusive participation processes also gen-
erate other benefits, such as the potential to “generate better projects and policies, secure 
buy-in for decisions, and limit delays, mistakes and lawsuits (Burby 2003),” especially if 
these processes become more inclusive (Bryson et al. 2013, p. 28; see also, Feldman and 
Quick 2009).
To capture the possible benefits of inclusive consultation processes, public officials can 
use and combine a diverse set of consultation tools when developing a new legislation. The 
literature on (public) participation processes (e.g., Bryson et al. 2013; Fung 2006; Nabatchi 
2012), for instance, emphasizes that “specific stakeholders may be involved in different 
ways at different steps or phases of the processes” and that particular types of stakeholder 
engagement, such as an approach focused on informing versus one of involving, require 
distinct tools (Bryson et al. 2013: 27). Furthermore, internal documents of public authori-
ties often state that different consultation tools are used for specific purposes, thus hinting 
at the possible strategic or instrumental nature of these processes. For instance, the Euro-
pean Commission indicates that online consultations enable them to reach “a broad range 
and large number of stakeholders,” whereas, for instance, expert groups and workshops are 
better suited to tap expertise, collect more detailed input, cover information gaps and make 
sure that underserved groups are not excluded (European Commission 2017a, p. 385). This 
statement also indicates that public authorities aim to ensure the engagement of a broad 
audience and are well aware of the risk to overlook certain constituencies.
Notwithstanding this awareness, one recurring concern regarding the consultation of stake-
holders is the dominance of business interests, as has been demonstrated in various recent 
studies at the national, EU and international level (Binderkrantz et al. 2015; Fraussen et al. 
2015; Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2018; Hanegraaff et al. 2016; Yackee and Yackee 2006; Yac-
kee 2015). Particularly in administrative venues, business interests appear to demonstrate 
higher levels of engagement compared to citizen interests. It is often argued that bureaucrats 
mainly require technical information and that business groups are generally better equipped to 
provide this kind of policy input. For instance, Yackee and Yackee (2006) clarify that business 
groups can rely on their own technical data as well as expert insights from members, while 
they also have more capacity to rely on the services of lawyers and commercial lobbyists, for 
instance, to turn their particular demand in concrete policy proposals. A high level of busi-
ness dominance might be problematic, as it may imply that organizations representing other 
constituencies with an important stake in a policy issue and capable of providing relevant 
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(and different types of) viewpoints and expertise are to a (much) lesser extent being heard by 
policymakers.
Importantly, these studies often only consider one particular consultation tool. To more 
accurately assess how consultation practices shape stakeholder diversity, we need to consider 
how the combination of different stakeholder tools within a similar policy process affects 
stakeholder diversity. In that regard, this paper makes two important and innovative contribu-
tions to the existing literature. First, it conceptualizes and empirically examines the occurrence 
of different consultation approaches at the European Union (EU) level, focusing on the policy 
formulation stage. Rather than studying one particular form of consultation, we focus on the 
use of different consultation tools, and specifically the way in which they are combined, which 
we refer to as a “consultation approach.”
Second, we assess the relation between consultation approaches and stakeholder diversity, 
focusing on business dominance. Much previous work has addressed these questions by focus-
ing on variation in stakeholder engagement and business dominance via a single and specific 
consultation tool, such as expert groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008, 2011; Rasmussen 
and Gross 2015) or online consultation (Quittkat 2011; Quittkat and Kotzian 2011; Røed and 
Wøien Hansen 2018). These studies, however, do not consider the possible implications of 
combining several consultation tools (but see Pedersen et al. 2015), even though that is a com-
mon practice in specific policy processes. We focus on the numerical dominance of business 
interests as it enables us to distinguish between organized stakeholders who advocate for dis-
tinct constituencies. Business dominance therefore provides a useful quantitative indicator of 
the extent which policymakers manage to reach out to different types of constituencies and 
consider various viewpoints when developing policy proposals.
In the next section of this paper, we clarify how a focus on consultation approaches enables 
a more comprehensive understanding of stakeholder consultation, and why such a perspective 
is both valuable and necessary to fully understand how the choice and combination of consul-
tation tools shapes stakeholder participation. Subsequently, our research design clarifies our 
focus on stakeholder consultation in regulatory governance at the EU level. Here, we intro-
duce two new datasets: a regulatory database and a stakeholder database, and explain how we 
conceptualize and operationalize our independent variable (i.e., consultation approaches), the 
dependent variable (i.e., business dominance), as well as three key issue characteristics that 
we include as control variables as it is commonly assumed in the interest group literature that 
the particular nature of a policy issues shapes the mobilization and hence also diversity of 
stakeholders (salience, political uncertainty and policy domain). The analysis first provides a 
descriptive overview of the variety of consultation approaches used by the Commission. The 
second part of the analysis includes a multivariate analysis of how these distinct approaches 
shape actor diversity. We find that regulatory issues that are characterized by a hybrid con-
sultation approach are significantly more dominated by business interests, compared to those 
issues characterized by closed consultation approaches. The concluding section of the paper 
discusses our key findings and their broader implications, clarifies the limitations of our 
approach and formulates suggestions for future research.
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Consultation approaches: a framework to examine stakeholder 
engagement
Research has generated mixed findings when studying the effects of consultation tools on 
stakeholder engagement and the dominance of particular (economic) interests. While some 
research has highlighted how consultation regimes reduce inequalities between policy 
insiders and policy outsiders (Bunea 2017), other work has demonstrated that rather than 
reduce inequalities in the political representation of different societal interests, consultation 
practices often reinforce bias as public officials are more likely to consult with established 
actors and organizations (Coen 2009; Eising 2007; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014). Rather 
than involving a more diverse and representative set of stakeholders, participatory practices 
“often end up including the ‘usual suspects,’ people who are easily recruited, vocal, and 
reasonably comfortable in public arenas” (Bryson et al. 2013, p. 29). Consultation tools are 
often biased toward similar organizations that often advocate for business interests. Con-
sequently, consultation processes frequently act as a “primary mechanism of policy repro-
duction,” as they result in policy outcomes that reflect the status quo (Howlett and Cashore 
2009).
To more accurately assess the effects of consultation tools on stakeholder diversity, 
this paper develops a novel framework that accounts for the combination of tools. Specifi-
cally, we complement earlier work on policy consultation by examining how variation in 
the combination of consultation tools, that is, the use of distinct consultation approaches, 
relates to the engagement of a different set of stakeholders. In this way, we acknowledge 
that these consultation tools generally are not mutually exclusive options, and consider 
their joint effect on the policy engagement of different stakeholders.
This study focuses on formalized consultation tools, and examines the engagement of 
organized stakeholders, which we define as any type of organization that has a stake in a 
particular policy issues, such as firms, business associations, NGOs, civil society organi-
zations and public authorities.1 This focus on organized stakeholders implies that we 
exclude individuals. In this way, our contribution primarily aims to clarify how consulta-
tion approaches could remedy or reinforce a business bias among organized stakeholders.
Our conceptualization of consultation approaches emphasizes their inclusive nature, 
a feature that is key to improve our understanding of how variation in consultation 
approaches relates to stakeholder participation and analyzing the possible democratic 
implications (see also Coen and Katsaitis 2018; and see Rasmussen and Toshkov 2013 for 
a similar approach, assessing the impact of different forms of consultation on legislative 
duration). Specifically, we distinguish three types of consultation approaches, depending 
on the specific combination of stakeholder tools within a specific policy process: open, 
closed and hybrid approaches (Table 1).
An open approach involves the utilization of tools that provide unlimited “self-selected” 
involvement to everybody who wishes to contribute—from private citizens to interest 
groups, firms and public institutions. The most common tool is a (web-based) consultation 
questionnaire. The goal of an open consultation approach is mostly to acquire input from 
a broad range of stakeholders as regards the issue at stake, such as information on possible 
solutions for societal problems or insight into the impact of particular policy measures. A 
closed consultation approach is rather different in nature. It involves tools such as expert 
1 In this paper, we interchangeably use the term stakeholders and organized stakeholders.
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groups, workshops and seminars, or combinations of these. In closed or targeted consulta-
tion approaches, public officials address specific and well-defined stakeholder groups and 
invite them to participate. Hybrid consultation approaches relate to consultation processes 
that make use of both open and closed consultation tools. 
As these three different consultation approaches—open, closed and hybrid—vary in 
their inclusive nature, we expect that the application of a particular consultation approach 
will have important implications for the dominance of business interests within the set of 
engaged stakeholders. Specifically, considering the absence of gatekeepers and the objec-
tive of policymakers to reach as broad an audience as possible, and provide equal partici-
pation opportunities for all interested actors to foster input legitimacy, one might assume 
that open consultation approaches generally attract a set of stakeholders that is character-
ized by higher levels of diversity, compared to closed consultation approaches. However, 
as business interests face less collective action problems and often are politically organized 
in greater numbers (Olson 1965), they might also dominate open consultation approaches 
(e.g., Hanegraaff et al. 2011).
In closed consultation approaches, stakeholders are selected or invited, a process that 
could have two rather different implications in terms of diversity. First, if policymakers 
are keen to involve different types of interests and, for instance, seek to ensure that both 
environmental and economic concerns are taken into account, the set of  engaged stake-
holders might be relatively diverse. Second, if the aim is to fine-tune details of policy ini-
tiatives, only stakeholders who have similar preferences or significant expertise might be 
invited to contribute, which could reduce stakeholder diversity. While this approach limits 
the capacity to identify multiple policy dimensions and understand policy issues from dif-
ferent perspectives (Bryson et al. 2013; Fung 2006; Nabatchi 2012), it reduces the amount 
of (potential) conflict. Considering these contrasting expectations, it is difficult to draw 
clear expectations on how a hybrid approach, that combines closed and open consultation 
approaches, will affect the set of stakeholders. In the following section on our research 
design and data, we clarify the consultation tools that we focus on in this paper and explain 
our operationalization of our central concepts and variables in more detail.
Research design and data
In this section, we present the datasets used in this paper and discuss the operationalization 
of our independent variable (i.e., consultation approach), dependent variable (i.e., busi-
ness dominance) and control variables. Before moving to the datasets, we clarify our focus 
on the EU and provide more background on the consultation processes of the European 
Commission.
Table 1  Consultation approaches
Approaches Description
Open approach Approach that only includes the use of (public) consultation tools, such as online consul-
tations, in which all interested stakeholders can get involved
Closed approach Approach that only includes the use of targeted consultation tools, such as expert groups 
and workshops, where stakeholders are granted access




The case: European Commission consultation process
We use the EU as a case to empirically explore the occurrence of different consultation 
approaches and assess their relationship with business dominance as an important indica-
tor of stakeholder diversity. More specifically, we focus on the European Commission, as 
this institution has exclusive right to initiate legislation. During the formative stage, that is 
before the Commission issues a legislative proposal that will subsequently be discussed in 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, public officials within the 
Commission consult internal and external stakeholders to obtain political and expert infor-
mation about the content and possible implications of the proposed legislation.
Since the early 2000s, starting with the White Paper on European Governance (Euro-
pean Commission 2001), the Commission has progressively developed a toolbox to imple-
ment consultation processes to effectively interact with stakeholders, leading to “one of 
the most elaborate and ambitious consultative regimes” (Bunea 2017, p. 47). The Better 
Regulation agenda has further developed the EU consultation regime by specifying in 
detail the different consultation tools available at the EU level and setting specific rules and 
recommendations (European Commission 2017b). A key objective is to realize a more bal-
anced engagement of different societal stakeholders, to ensure public officials obtain infor-
mation and insights from a variety of stakeholders. While the Commission highlights that 
it is “strongly committed to engaging with stakeholders and citizens throughout the policy 
cycle and has invested significantly in a range of tools to engage better about its activities,” 
it also acknowledges that “despite the availability of these tools, it is clear that the level of 
participation has not reached its full potential and some stakeholders are still unwilling or 
able to engage” (European Commission 2017b, p. 13).
Public officials of the Commission have certain degree of leeway in choosing their con-
sultation approach. That is, they can complement different types of tools to “engage all 
relevant stakeholders and to target potential information gaps” (European Commission 
2017a, p. 391). This statement clearly indicates that the Commission is well aware of the 
possible limitation of particular consultation tools and therefore recommends a combina-
tion of them, rather than reliance on one particular tool. This flexibility might be limited 
by legal requirements (such as the obligation to organize a public consultation), as well as 
institutional norms (such as a strong emphasis on expert-driven or evidence-based policy-
making, which would stimulate the formalized involvement of experts). Still, even within 
this framework, public officials make choices regarding which (additional) tools are being 
used, their respective timing and (possibly) the open or closed nature of these initiatives. 
In what follows, we present two datasets that enable us to examine to what extent and how 
public officials combine different consultation tools and the implications of these choices 
for stakeholder diversity.
Datasets
We use two datasets collected in the context of a broader research project. First, our regula-
tory database includes the consultation tools related to 64 regulatory issues (Regulations 
and Directives) passed between 2015 and 2016 that followed the Ordinary Legislative Pro-
cedure—the standard decision-making process used for adopting EU legislation (European 
Union 2012). We decided to exclude distributive policy issues and focus on issues with a 
regulatory character that represent the dominant type of legislation passed at the EU level, 
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(see also Majone 1999).2 We clarify the implications of our focus on EU regulatory issues 
for the generalization of our findings in the conclusion of this paper.
To account for variation across policy areas (Van Ballaert 2017), the paper focuses on 
six different policy areas in which the EU has exclusive or shared competences with the 
member states: (1) Finance, banking, pensions, securities, insurances; (2) State aids, com-
mercial policies; (3) Health; (4) Sustainability, energy, environment; (5) Transport, tele-
communications; (6) Agriculture and fisheries.
The second dataset is the stakeholder database, which includes all the actors and organ-
izations who mobilized in the 64 regulations through different consultation tools. Even 
though the regulatory database contains detailed information on 64 regulatory issues, our 
focus is on 41 issues that had stakeholder engagement through one of the three consultation 
tools discussed below (i.e., open consultations, workshops and public hearings, and expert 
groups).3 The stakeholder database includes detailed information for each of the 2617 
stakeholders that engaged in the policy processes related to the selected regulatory issues. 
The stakeholders involved in the regulations were manually collected by analyzing sev-
eral EU documents. More specifically, the Impact Assessment of the Commission and the 
Commission Proposal were thoroughly reviewed to identify the different consultation tools 
used and the stakeholders engaged in each of them. If these documents did not provide the 
detailed list of stakeholders and only mentioned the consultation tool, a search within EU 
websites was conducted to obtain detailed information about the actors involved. If the 
list of stakeholders was not publicly available in the website, the responsible DG was con-
tacted to request the list of actors that participated in the consultation tool mentioned in the 
official documents.
In total, 2617 stakeholders have been identified. This includes interest groups as well 
as firms, institutions and public authorities, but excludes private citizens and anonymous 
responses to Commission’s consultations. We coded each identified stakeholder following 
a similar method and codebook as the INTEREURO project, a project designed to examine 
Table 2  Consultation tools of the European Commission
Source: Adapted from European Commission (2017a, b, p. 396)
Consultation tool Concrete goals
Public consultation Gather inputs from a broad range of stakeholders through different instru-
ments
Public hearings and workshops Gather input and specific information from targeted stakeholders through 
direct interaction
Expert groups Gather input and advice and expert knowledge from experts on a well-
defined mandate
2 Out of 127 legislations passed between 2015 and 2016 that followed the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, 
we excluded cases that were exclusively distributive in nature (n = 10), those that centered on EU agency 
functioning or EU internal matters (n = 8) those that could not be classified in any of the six policy domains 
of interest for the study (n = 36) and codifications of previous regulations (n = 9).
3 Out the 23 regulations excluded, six had some sort of consultation process in place. More specifically, 
four regulations had stakeholder involvement through direct meetings, focus groups or interviews. These 
have been excluded because none of the tools presented in Table 2 were used. In addition, it was not pos-
sible to obtain information about the stakeholders involved through public consultations and workshops in 
two regulations; therefore, these have also been excluded from the analyses.
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the mobilization, strategies and influence of interest group in the European Union (Bernha-
gen et al. 2016; Beyers et al. 2014).
Explanatory variable: consultation approaches
The use and combination of different consultation tools is mostly decided by the public 
officials responsible for the dossier (see European Commission 2017a).
The Commission distinguishes eight consultation tools. In alphabetical order, these are: 
(1) Conferences, public hearings and events; (2) Eurobarometer surveys; (3) Expert groups 
of the Commission; (4) Focus groups; (5) Interviews; (6) Public consultations; (7) Consul-
tations targeting SME’s—SME panel; and (8) Workshops, meetings and seminars. In the 
context of this paper, we focus on a more limited set of consultation tools. In this study, 
we consider three different types of consultation tools: (1) “Open (online) consultations,”4 
(2) “Conferences, public hearings and events,” which have been merged with “Workshops, 
meetings and seminars” due to their similar formats and (3) “Expert groups of the Com-
mission.”5 These consultation tools are included to be consistent with the objective and 
scope of the study. Firstly, these are the formal consultation tools that were applied in the 
regulations included in our sample and for which data were publicly available. Secondly, 
we focus on those consultation tools that target organized stakeholders, instead of private 
citizens—such as interviews with experts and Eurobarometer surveys. Table 2 presents the 
consultation tools included in our study. 
Dependent variable: business dominance
To examine how consultation approaches affect the diversity of stakeholders, we focus on 
the percentage of business organizations in each regulation (Berkhout et  al. 2017; Ras-
mussen and Carroll 2014). That is, we operationalize stakeholder diversity by considering 
business dominance, as it enables us to distinguish between organized societal stakeholders 
who advocate for distinct constituencies. This variable was constructed by dichotomizing 
a coded variable that categorized stakeholders in one of the following groups: professional 
associations, business associations, firms, citizen groups, labor unions, institutions, public 
authorities and others.6 More specifically, when a stakeholder was categorized as Business 
(i.e., professional associations, business associations or firms), it was coded as “1,” and “0” 
4 Since 2017, legislative initiatives that entail an Impact Assessment should include a wide-ranging, open 
web-based consultation. According to the Commission, this “ensures transparency and accountability,” 
while it also provides “any stakeholder the possibility to contribute” (European Commission 2017a, p. 391). 
However, the consultations approaches implemented for the set of regulations included in our sample were 
developed between 2009 and 2014, when the “Better Regulation Toolbox” was not yet approved. Conse-
quently, we expect to find certain degree of variation in the use of this consultation tools across regulations.
5 We do not include interviews and consultations targeting SMEs because they focus on particular target 
group, nor do we include Eurobarometer survey as they are mainly used to assess the opinions of European 
citizens, rather than stakeholders on a particular issue. Focus groups were not found among the sampled 
regulations. Lastly, direct meetings have been excluded as they are not considered among the main formal 
consultation tools listed by the European Commission.
6 An inter-coder reliability check was run on 100 observations chosen at random from the complete sample 
list of stakeholders collected. Two coders independently coded six variables for these 100 observations. The 
Krippendorff’s inter-coder reliability test for variable used to construct the variable ‘business dominance’ 
was α = 0.83, which confirms the reliability of the data (Krippendorff 2004).
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when otherwise (Hanegraaff and Berkhout 2018). The final variable, at the level of regula-
tion, has a value that ranges from 0—if no businesses are present—to 1—if only business 
participated.
Control variables: regulatory issue characteristics
When assessing the effects of consultation approaches on our dependent variable, we also 
control for the potential effect that particular issue features may have on business domi-
nance. As argued by Klüver et  al. (2015), we need to account for the contextual nature 
of (EU) politics to better understand stakeholder mobilization and diversity. Policy issues 
differ considerably in the level of attention they receive, the conflict and uncertainty they 
cause among political actors, and the constituencies that are affected by them. In this study, 
we therefore include salience, political uncertainty and policy domain as control factors.
The first characteristic considered here is the salience of the regulation, which can be 
captured in different ways (see Beyers et al. 2018 for a discussion). We focus on media cov-
erage, which is considered a valid and often-used indicator of public salience as it is inde-
pendent from the perception of the actors that are directly involved in the decision-making 
process (De Bruycker et al. 2019). Understood as the degree of attention that a regulation 
attracted in the media, salience is calculated by counting the number of relevant articles 
published in five EU-wide outlets. In the analyses, we use the log of this count variable, 
given a skewed distribution with high outliers. The time frame we use ranges from 2 years 
before the first consultation tool was implemented up to December 31, 2017.7 Previous 
research has proved the importance of salience of policy issues in explaining mobilization 
(for a discussion, see Klüver et al. 2015). In this case, we expect that media salience will 
increase the visibility of the policy issue among constituents, leading to higher levels of 
mobilization, particularly among non-economic groups (see De Bruycker et al. 2019, 296).
Secondly, political uncertainty is defined as the political contestation regarding a leg-
islative proposal and is operationalized by quantifying and combining the voting results 
in the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament regarding the regula-
tions.8 Following a similar logic as Gray et  al. (2004), we assume that higher levels of 
political uncertainty will trigger the mobilization of a larger and more diverse set of stake-
holders. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is the lowest level of political uncer-
tainty and 1 is the highest level of political uncertainty.
Lastly, we account for the policy domain of the regulation, as previous research demon-
strated considerable variation in consultation approaches across policy areas (e.g., Quittkat 
7 The outlets included in the Factiva search are: Financial Times, Politico Europe, Agence Europe, EurAc-
tive, EUObserver and European Voice. For each regulation, a search code was developed including key 
terms related to the regulation and general terms related to European Union decision-making process. Sub-
sequently, human coders examined the articles obtained via the Factiva search and excluded those that were 
not deemed as relevant. That is, only those that specifically discussed the regulation or the regulatory pro-
cess leading to the regulation included in our sample were coded as relevant.
8 We calculate our political uncertainty score with the following formula:












)2 is the squared percentage of yes-votes within each legislative body involved in the deci-
sion-making process (for the EU: (VEuropean parliament)2 + (VCouncil)2 ); n is the total number of legislative bod-
ies involved; (1−) is used to transform the output value in a score from 0 to 1 (1 being the highest possible 




and Finke 2008; Rasmussen and Toshkov 2013; Van Ballaert 2017). More precisely, we 
distinguish regulations developed under “core” economic Directorate-Generals (DGs) of 
the Commission from those developed in non-economic DGs.9 In this case, we expect that 
issues under economic DGs are more likely to have higher incidence of business organiza-
tions when compared to those developed under non-economic DGs. Table 6 in “Appendix” 
provides a summary of the descriptive statistics and the correlations coefficients among all 
the variables presented above.
Analysis
The analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we present a descriptive overview of different 
consultation tools used by the Commission and the frequency of open, closed and hybrid 
consultation approaches. Secondly, we examine the effects of consultation approaches on 
business dominance, while controlling for variation in issue characteristics.
Descriptive overview of consultation approaches
Table 3 presents how the Commission uses and combines the different consultation tools 
in each of the 41 regulations included in the study. In total, we identified seven distinct 
combinations of consultation tools, each of them related to one of the three consultation 
approaches presented in Table  1. In almost 50% of the issues examined, public officials 
relied on a single consultation tool—either open or closed. More specifically, there are 
three regulations on which only open consultation took place; therefore, these regulations 
relied on an open consultation approach to obtain input from stakeholders. For instance, in 
our sample, Directive 2015/1513 relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources relied exclusively on two open 
consultations conducted in June–July 2009 and July–October 2010, leading to the engage-
ment of 138 stakeholders. Regarding the closed consultation approach, six regulations 
Table 3  Frequency and stakeholder engagement
Combination of consultation tools Consultation approach Frequency (%)
Open consultation Open 3 (7.32)
Hearings and workshops Closed 6 (14.63)
Expert groups Closed 9 (21.95)
Hearings and workshops + expert groups Closed 4 (9.75)
Open consultations + hearings and workshops Hybrid 4 (9.75)
Open consultations + expert groups Hybrid 7 (17.07)
Open consultations + hearings and workshops + expert groups Hybrid 8 (19.51)
9 Regulations have been coded as 1 when the DGs responsible was Competition (COMP), Economic and 
Financial Affairs (ECFIN), Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA), 
Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW) or Taxation and Customs Union 
(TAXUD). Otherwise, the regulations have been coded as 0 (Murdoch and Trondal 2013 p. 7).
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exclusively relied on hearings and workshops to obtain input from stakeholders; in nine 
cases, stakeholders were only involved through expert groups; and four regulations used 
a combination of closed consultation tools. This means that nineteen regulations exclu-
sively relied on closed consultation approaches. An example in that regard is Regulation 
2016/792 on harmonized indices of consumer prices and the house price index, which was 
discussed in expert meetings composed of representatives of national public authorities. 
The last three rows of Table 3 present the different combinations of tools that lead to hybrid 
consultation approaches. That is, they combine open consultation tools with at least one 
closed consultation tool, or the other way around. One regulation using such an approach 
was Directive 2016/97 on insurance distribution, which relied on input from stakeholders 
involved through an open consultation conducted from November 26, 2010, until February 
28, 2011, followed by a workshop and an expert group meeting. As noted by the Commis-
sion, and illustrated by our findings, there is no one size–size-fits-all approach to stake-
holder engagement at the EU level. As Table 3 demonstrates, there is a lot of variation in 
terms of which consultation approaches are being used to gather input from stakeholders.
In Table 4, we provide an aggregate picture that collapses the different combinations 
of consultation tools into three consultation approaches: open, closed and hybrid. The 
two most frequently used consultation approaches are closed and hybrid. Unsurprisingly, 
compared to an open approach (which is used on only three regulations in our sample), 
hybrid approaches on average attract more stakeholders, while closed approaches on aver-
age engage a more limited set of actors. It is important to note that the standard deviations 
presented in Table 4 are large relative to their means, indicating highly skewed patterns 
of interest groups engagement. This is consistent with previous research studying inter-
est group mobilization that showed that although a limited set of policy issues attract a 
(very) large number of stakeholders, the majority of issues are characterized by the engage-
ment of a rather limited amount of stakeholders (Baumgartner et  al. 2009; Halpin and 
Thomas 2012). Yet, the difference between the mobilization potential of open and hybrid 
approaches is quite remarkable. While an open approach theoretically enables all inter-
ested stakeholders to participate, these findings show that combining open tools with tar-
geted consultation tools results in a larger set of engaged stakeholders. However, whereas 
the difference between the number of stakeholders involved between hybrid and closed 
approaches is statistically significant (t(36) = (− 4.893), p < 0.001), a t test does not lead to 
significant differences when comparing hybrid and open consultation approaches.
Business dominance across consultation approaches
To what extent do different consultation approaches lead to a more diverse set of stake-
holders? As specified before, we focus on a single yet key dimension of diversity, i.e., 
business dominance (cf., Berkhout et al. 2017). The analyses presented below explore the 
Table 4  Frequency and 
stakeholder engagement  per 
consultation approach
Consultation approach Frequency (%) Average stake-
holders engaged 
(SD)
Open 3 (7.32) 96.33 (41.01)
Closed 19 (46.34) 44.894 (41.95)
Hybrid 19 (46.34) 175.47(108.313)
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relationship between the two most frequent consultation approaches, namely closed and 
hybrid, and business dominance. Open approaches have been excluded from this part of 
the analysis due to the very low number of cases encountered, which could generate biased 
results. As clarified above, more than 90% of the included cases are characterized by either 
a “closed” or a “hybrid” consultation approach.
It is worth noting that the average proportion of business interests in the 38 regulations 
using either closed or hybrid approaches is 49%. Yet, as shown in Fig.  1, this distribu-
tion varies significantly across consultation approaches. The regulations that used closed 
consultation approaches (i.e., hearings and workshops and/or expert groups) have signifi-
cantly lower percentages of business groups (M = 0.362, SD = 0.321), compared to those 
that implemented hybrid approaches (M = 0.613, SD = 0.122; t(36) = (− 3.173), p = 0.003).
To further explore the relationship between consultation approaches and business bias, 
we conduct a multivariate analysis. Table 5 presents the results of a fractional regression 
Fig. 1  Business dominance across consultation approaches
Table 5  Fractional regression 
analysis on business dominance
VIF scores range from 1.184 and 1.453, indicating that multicollinear-





Hybrid approach .741 .364 .049
Salience .227 .156 .154
Political uncertainty 1.636 2.145 .452
Non-economic DG REF
Economic DG .254 .392 .522





model.10 This is an appropriate method considering that the dependent variable is a per-
centage that ranges from 0 (i.e., no business presence) to 1 (i.e., complete business domi-
nance) (see Papke and Wooldridge 1996). According to the results, hybrid consultation 
approaches lead to a significantly higher level of business presence even when controlling 
for issue characteristics. More specifically, the marginal effects of the model presented in 
Table  5 indicate that implementing a hybrid approach increases business dominance by 
18% (SE = 0.087), compared to regulations that use closed approaches. Remarkably, none 
of the control variables related to the specific character of the regulations (i.e., salience, 
political uncertainty and policy domain) seem to be significantly related to business domi-
nance. This finding underlines that variation in stakeholder diversity is primarily driven by 
variation in consultation approaches.
It is worth highlighting the important role and impact of the inclusion of closed con-
sultation tools within hybrid consultation approaches. For instance, “Directive 2016/97 on 
insurance distribution,” related to requirement for purchasing insurance products, used a 
hybrid consultation approach by combining an open consultation with an expert group and 
a workshop. In this case, 113 business organizations out of 210 stakeholders participated 
through the different consultation tools. More specifically, 59% of the stakeholders were 
businesses—a similar percentage as the one presented in Fig. 1. However, if we unpack the 
distribution of stakeholders for each consultation tool, we observe important differences. 
Whereas 77% of the stakeholders involved through the open consultation were businesses, 
for the workshop and expert group the proportion of business interests is, respectively, 
42% and 12%. A similar example is “Regulation 2016/426 on appliances burning gaseous 
fuels,” which established rules for commercializing burning gaseous fuels appliances and 
dealt with the energy efficiency of these products. The regulation also relied on a hybrid 
approach: an open consultation that mostly attracted business interests (i.e., 81% of the 
stakeholders involved), and an expert group in which only 34% of the 50 organizations 
involved were businesses. The final percentage of businesses in this regulation was 53%. 
These examples illustrate that in some cases that apply a hybrid consultation tools, busi-
ness dominance was decreased by using closed consultation tools, rather than the open 
consultation tools.
Finally, if we examine closed consultation approaches, we observe a striking dominance 
of public authorities. As shown in Fig. 2 (which offers a detailed categorization of group 
type for each type of consultation approach), the lower levels of business organizations in 
closed approaches are explained by a smaller proportion of firms, yet also a much higher 
prevalence of public authorities. In this vein, we can state that, particularly among closed 
consultation tools of the European Commission, “much political ‘lobbying’ is government 
lobbying government” (Halpin and Thomas 2012, p. 595). Importantly, though, we find 
variation in the prevalence of public authorities among closed approaches. For instance, 
two regulations about fisheries using closed approaches (“Regulation 2016/2094” and 
“Regulations 2016/1139” establishing a long-term and multiannual plan for certain fish-
eries) organized large expert groups with an important presence of business. Yet in both 
cases the percentage was around 50%, which is lower than the incidence of business organ-
izations found in an average case using a hybrid approach. Another example of an issue 
characterized by a closed approach (including a workshop and an expert groups) is “Regu-
lation 2016/424 on cableway installations”—aimed at providing high levels protection and 
10 To confirm our results, we also ran an OLS regression with the same variables. Importantly, the coef-
ficients and the p-values are consistent with the ones presented in Table 5.
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safety to cableway installations designed to carry persons. In total, 30 different stakeholders 
participated in the consultation process, of which only 6 (i.e., 20%) were business organi-
zations. More specifically, these 6 business groups participated in the workshops organ-
ized by the Commission, while the expert group was exclusively formed by representatives 
of public authorities. Similarly, only 2 out of the 35 organizations consulted to developed 
“Directive 2016/2102 on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applications of public 
sector bodies” were business groups. Again, a workshop and an expert group were organ-
ized to consult stakeholders when developing this directive and the two business groups 
participated in the workshop, whereas the expert groups were exclusively composed of 
public authorities and institutions such as universities, hospitals or schools.
An important difference between the two approaches as depicted in Fig. 2 is the high 
incidence of individual firms in hybrid approaches, which is mostly explained by their high 
level of mobilization in public consultation tools. The low entry barriers of public consul-
tations facilitate the involvement of multiple firms that are not that frequently invited in 
closed approaches. An additional interesting observation derived from Fig. 2 is the limited 
prevalence of citizen groups in both closed and hybrid approaches. That is, public officials 
do not engage a more diverse set of actors when applying closed consultation approaches. 
Instead, they appear to favor the technical knowledge and expertise that is supplied by 
other public authorities.
Discussion
Our results indicate that public officials mostly use either closed or hybrid consultation 
approaches and that there is a lot of variation in how consultation tools are being combined 













Business associations Firms Professional Associations
Public Authorities & Institutions Citizen Groups Labor Unions
Fig. 2  Percentage of stakeholders per consultation approach
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combined does not reveal a clear logic that policymakers follow when making decisions on 
which consultation approach to apply.
On the one hand, this raises questions about the rationale behind these choices, and the 
apparent absence of clear bureaucratic guidelines on how to combine consultation tools. 
Yet, the ability to address complex policy problems might not be increased by implement-
ing more streamlined procedures and instead necessitates some “redundancies.” This alter-
native point of view was recently highlighted by Baumgartner and Jones, who argue that 
we cannot expect a “single ideological structure, nor a single hierarchically controlled 
bureaucratic process, to generate useful solutions to social problems that we do not even 
yet fully understand. Only messy, overlapping, entropic information collection processes 
are likely to do this” (2018, p. 8).
On the other hand, ensuring the participation of a more diverse set of stakeholders 
might not be the (only) priority of Commission officials. In that sense, as rightly under-
lined by Van Ballaert, the chosen consultation approach might be part of larger political 
battle and strategic considerations from policymakers (that might vary from issue to issue) 
and could also inform the chosen consultation approach. For instance, he clarifies that the 
Commission might also be “using recommendations from online consultation to pressure 
stakeholders thereafter in other fora or by granting privileged access to supportive actors” 
(Van Ballaert 2017, 13–14).
Importantly, our results suggest that to avoid business dominance it is necessary to stra-
tegically select certain consultation approaches. More specifically, our study shows that 
approaches combining targeted and open tools do not necessarily lower the dominance 
of business interests. On the contrary, our results indicate that closed approaches are sig-
nificantly less dominated by business interests. Hence, from a normative point of view, it 
is important to highlight that closed consultation approaches, which entail higher levels 
of interaction and discussion between public officials and stakeholders (Birnbaum et  al. 
2015), are characterized by lower presence of business organizations. This does not nec-
essarily imply that closed approaches are more “balanced” in nature compared to hybrid 
ones. Rather, while hybrid approaches are often biased in favor of business organizations, 
closed ones are frequently dominated by public authorities, as demonstrated in Fig. 2.
Our findings also imply that public officials have a more active role to play. They clearly 
have some leeway in deciding which tools will be combined, which as we demonstrated 
has important implications for the type of stakeholders that become involved, and the soci-
etal voices that are being heard. Most importantly, our results suggest that a more inclusive 
approach requires an active role of public officials in carefully applying and combining 
different consultation tools. While such combinations require a substantial investment in 
time and resources of both public officials and stakeholders, the engagement of a broader 
and more diverse set of non-state actors could lead to more effective and legitimate policy 
outcomes, a result that would make such efforts very worthwhile from a democratic per-
spective. Yet, the participation of a broader set of stakeholders could also lead to increased 
conflicts and more disputed policy outcomes. Future research would surely benefit from 
examining these relations in more detail.
As for stakeholders, it raises questions about the extent to which they should partici-
pate in all these different tools or rather focus their attention on one particular consultation 
channel (because of strategic considerations in order to be more influential, or as they do 
not enjoy access to other channels). In that regard, it should be noted that although aca-
demics often studied consultation tools as channels for influence (e.g., Judge and Thomson 
2019), they are not the only nor the most important or effective one (Lundberg and Hys-
ing 2016). More fundamentally, we concur with Baldwin that the value of consultation 
 Policy Sciences
1 3
processes extends beyond avenues for influencing public policy. Specifically, she argues 
for a broader conceptualization of (possible) influence, stating that “stakeholder influence 
includes not only measurable change to policy decisions but also regular participation and 
the ability to raise issues and participate in deliberation with decision makers” (Baldwin 
2018, p. 2).
Conclusion
This paper conceptualizes and analyzes the occurrence of consultation approaches and their 
effects on the diversity of stakeholder engagement. To so identify variation in consultation 
approaches, we have considered different consultation tools and examined the way they are 
combined by public officials. This comprehensive approach to understanding the relation-
ship between consultation approaches and stakeholder participation has important norma-
tive and practical implications. As stated by Bunea (2017, p. 46) “Consultations constitute 
a direct communication link between decision makers and affected actors and represent an 
important channel through which policy feedback is received in the policy process about 
the feasibility of policy choices, the legitimacy of adopted measures and the potential chal-
lenges in policy implementation (Rasmussen et al. 2014).” A better understanding of these 
processes is highly important in a context where public officials are increasingly dependent 
on stakeholders to gain information and expertise, and high investments are made in con-
sultation processes in order to improve the effectiveness of policy measures and reinforce 
the legitimacy of public institutions (Craft and Halligan 2017; van den Berg 2017). Con-
sidering this trend and these objectives, it seems important that consultations do not rein-
force existing inequalities in the political representation of societal stakeholders. Moreover, 
in practical terms, our findings shed new light on the actual implications of using different 
consultation approaches for the set of participating stakeholders and in this way provide a 
unique contribution to the existing literature and valuable insights for public officials.
Specifically, we find that hybrid approaches, that combine open and targeted consulta-
tion tools, lead to a significantly higher dominance of business interests among organized 
stakeholders, compared to closed consultation approaches, which are mostly dominated 
by public authorities. The dominance of businesses and public authorities in consultation 
approaches has important effects on the legitimacy of the Commission, as we find a very 
limited participation of citizen groups, whose participation in the process may “by itself, 
be of normative democratic value” (Yackee and Yackee 2006, 137). Furthermore, their 
higher level of mobilization might reduce the diversity of viewpoints and expertise pro-
vided to policymakers, and ultimately result in policy decisions that are less attentive to the 
public interest (Yackee and Yackee 2006, 137). Yet, we concur with Klüver that “the sheer 
number of groups does not necessarily say anything about whether a political system is 
biased toward a certain group type” (Lowery et al. 2015, 1219). Thus, additional research 
is necessary to examine whether business dominance in hybrid consultation also implies 
higher levels of policy influence.
The interpretation and generalization of the findings are subject to four impor-
tant limitations. Firstly, due to our focus on the consultation approaches used by the 
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European Commission, studies focusing on national or subnational policy venues might 
lead to other results given different consultation approaches. Importantly, many OECD 
countries implement consultation tools that are rather similar to the ones considered in 
this paper (Rodrigo and Amo 2006). In that regard, we believe our framework can also 
be applied at the national level or subnational level and encourage work that identifies 
and compares the occurrence of the different consultation approaches in multiple coun-
tries, and assesses their implications for stakeholder diversity.
Secondly, we focus on regulatory issues. Due to the technical and complex nature of 
many of these issues, they tend to attract a higher proportion of business actors, even 
though this varies considerably across the regulations we studied. Future research would 
benefit from including (re)distributive issues as well, in order to examine whether there 
are significant differences for these two types of policies. For instance, even if EU poli-
cymaking is highly technical and public officials especially look for policy expertise, it 
seems likely that distributive issues will lead to the engagement of more citizen groups, 
as well as more public authorities (e.g., Beyers et al. 2015), and are therefore character-
ized by a lower level of business dominance.
Thirdly, we have focused our attention on organized stakeholders and excluded indi-
vidual citizens. While individuals participate in consultation processes at the EU level, 
it is very difficult to establish which specific constituency or societal interests these peo-
ple represent or advocate for, as they might provide input on a scientific basis (e.g., as 
academic expert), a citizen concerned about a particular cause, or a professional who 
has specific economic stakes and interests in the issue at the hand. Still, future work 
would benefit from including both organized societal stakeholders and citizens who par-
ticipate on an individual basis, especially considering that the EU and several national 
governments aim to increase the involvement of citizens in policymaking (e.g., Hen-
driks and Lees-Marshment 2019).
Finally, we acknowledge that this is a first and partly exploratory study based on the 
consultation approaches used in the policy formulation stage for a limited set of regu-
lations. This is a suitable approach for demonstrating the value of analyzing consulta-
tion approaches through a novel and more comprehensive conceptual framework. Future 
work is necessary to examine whether our findings vary across stages of policy cycle, 
between government departments, or across political systems. In addition, to further 
improve our understanding of the relationship between issue-level features, consultation 
approaches and stakeholder participation, a greater variety of consultation tools might 
be included, ideally with large-n datasets that consider an even longer period, fully 
aligned with the slow pace of the legislative process. At the same time, to gain insight 
into the consultation choices made by public officials, and the extent to which they are 
aware and act upon the trade-offs of prioritizing certain consultation approaches, in-
depth case studies, surveys and experiments are equally important, as they will provide 
more insight into considerations public officials make when selecting one consultation 
approach over another. While such choices will be shaped by habits and routines, spe-
cific objectives could also play a part here. One can imagine that different tools are used 
or prioritized and combined when the aim is to gather expertise or establish legitimacy, 
or when the goal is to open up the process or rather limit the engagement with  stake-
holder to a narrower set of actors given the technical nature of the policy issue.
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In conclusion, our central argument here is relatively simple but highly significant. 
If we aim to fully capture and comprehend processes of stakeholder engagement, we 
should not limit our attention to one specific tool, but rather consider all the different 
tools that have been applied by public officials in the context of singular policy process. 
If we instead only study one tool, our assessment of important questions, such as stake-
holder bias and corporate capture, is likely to be inaccurate, as it is based on a partial 
picture of the stakeholder engagement process. Furthermore, if our standard assumption 
is that within a singular policy process multiple tools will be applied, this has important 
implications for studying the representation of societal stakeholders and the role of pub-
lic officials.
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Table 6  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
*p < 0.05
Variable Mean (SD) Min–max Business 
dominance




.488 (.271) 0–.895 1
Hybrid approach .500 (.507) 0–1 0.468* 1
Salience 2.302 (1.330) 0–4.585 0.453* 0.377* 1
Political uncer-
tainty
.187 (.095) .034–.452 0.259 0.166 0.401* 1
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